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         NATO, THE KOSOVO WAR, AND NEOLIBERAL THEORY 
 
               By Sean Kay1 
 
Introduction and Overview 
 
 Throughout the 1990s, neoliberal institututional theory dominated much of the 
academic literature and was reflected in policy assumptions of decision-makers working 
on European security.  Scholars looked to the “alphabet soup” of international institutions 
and their principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures including the United 
Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe, the Council of 
Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Meanwhile, policymakers invested considerable time and resources into using 
international institutions for managing risk and reducing fear in contemporary security 
relationships.  It seemed that, in the European case, institutions mattered.  However, the 
central question of how security institutions mattered in terms of security provision was 
left unanswered until the Kosovo conflict of 1999.  In the case of warfighting, NATO did 
matter.  However, contrary to neoliberal expections, NATO’s institutional attributes 
raised the transaction costs of security provision.  As an international institution, NATO’s 
involvement in security provision was a liability, not an asset. 
 NATO and its extensive post-Cold War adaptation has been a primary case study 
for applying neoliberal theory to security institutions.  By the late 1990s, NATO had been 
transformed by its members away from its core alliance functions.  NATO served as a 
tool for organizing collective diplomacy toward the post-communist countries of Eastern 
Europe and its institutional functions were adapted so non-members could engage in its 
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cooperative mechanisms.  New institutional structures including a North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace, and 
membership enlargement were evidence that NATO was adaptable to a new security 
environment.  This article tests assumptions about NATO’s post-Cold War institutional 
development and security provision via a case study of the Kosovo war.  Through this 
study, the article seeks to shed light on the conditions under which international 
institutions are more or less likely to contribute to security provision. 
The Kosovo war is a crucial test case for neoliberal theory for six reasons.  First, 
the objectives of the war reflect a new value-laden institutional mission manifested in 
NATO’s principles and norms.  The long track record of inhumanity promulgated by 
Slobodan Milosevic was the core reason the international community sought to intervene 
in Kosovo.  However, when states went to war, the decision on timing was primarily a 
taken to make credible NATO’s new missions.  Second, after ten years of signaling and 
warning among states and non-state actors about the risk of regional instability spreading 
from a conflict in Kosovo, this should have been an easy project for NATO to handle - 
especially since the Kosovo war was its second major foray into the Balkans.  Third, 
NATO’s core function of information sharing via multilateral planning had allowed its 
members a decade to prepare for exactly the kind of crises presented by Kosovo.  Fourth, 
neoliberal assumptions about NATO would predict that the institution can lower the 
transaction costs of security cooperation.  However, as this article demonstrates, the 
decision to fight a war through NATO’s rules and procedures actually increased the 
transaction costs of security provision.  As the war progressed, states found that the best 
way to lower transaction costs of security outcomes was to skirt NATO’s rules and 
 3
procedures.  Fifth, since the Kosovo war, NATO’s key member, the United States, has 
moved away from NATO and there is a collective perception among the member states 
that the key lesson was to never do something like this again.  Sixth, a new debate over 
the role and efficacy of institutions is likely to emerge following the collapse of United 
Nations agreement on Iraq policy and the subsequent American-led invasion of Iraq.  The 
Iraq war illustrated structural trends in American foreign policy which have roots in the 
Kosovo experience.   Understanding both the explanatory nature of neoliberalism as a 
cause of NATO’s war on Serbia and the costs of waging war through an international 
institution are important both understanding both the theory and practice of international 
relations. 
 This article surveys neoliberal assumptions about international institutions and 
security and assesses these assumptions within the context of the major scholarly 
literature on NATO in the 1990s.  A framework for analysis is provided for testing 
independent and dependent variables as they are applicable to understanding the role and 
function of NATO as an international institution.  Two core neoliberal assumptions about 
institutionalized multilateral cooperation are then examined in the context of 
contemporary liberal theory:  1)  principles, norms and the timing and cause of the 
Kosovo war;  and  2)  the relationship between information sharing, institutional rules, 
procedures, and transaction costs.  The central conclusion is that NATO’s involvement in 
Kosovo is best understood as a spectrum in which the rationale for the war, and the 
reason the war started when it did, are best explained by neoliberal theory.  However, in 
terms of the hard test of security provision, NATO’s institutional attributes decreased the 
efficiency of security outcomes.  Because, as this study shows, the presence of NATO in 
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warfighting actually increased the transaction costs of security provision, the institution 
has become increasingly irrelevant since the Kosovo war.  NATO has been adapted and 
survived – but it is a hollow institution that is politically unmanageable, militarily 
dysfunctional, and strategically challenged.  The theoretical and policy irony is that the 
decision to go to war through NATO confirms some core assumptions of neoliberal 
institutionalism – but it also diminished the institutional relevance of NATO.  
Consequently, the emphasis that neoliberal theory put on NATO in the 1990s as a key 
case study illustrating the value of the theory appears circumspect. 
 
Neoliberalism and International Security 
 Neoliberal theory posits that “institutions matter”.  This is not a view that is 
rejected by critics of institutional theory – primarily contemporary realists.  The core 
issue of contention is really over how they matter and whether institutions should be 
treated as independent variables, dependent variables – or both?  Traditionally, neoliberal 
scholarship focused on the study of international regimes and the norms, principles, rules, 
and decision-making procedures that they embody – either through formal or informal 
processes.  Such dynamics were seen as an important reflection of modern 
interdependence which creates a rationalist demand by states seeking to maximize gains 
through cooperation rather than by pursuing classic self-help strategies.2 
 Neoliberal theory places international institutions and their embodiment in 
international organizations at the core of state-driven efforts to create cooperation from 
international anarchy.  Anarchy, or the absence of a government over governments, 
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creates a demand for predictability in international politics, manifested in various 
attempts at multilateral governance.  States are seen as having more to gain from 
cooperation than pursuing self-help strategies.  So long as the benefits of cooperation 
outpace the costs, states will sacrifice short-term interests for long-term mutual gains.3  
The fact that states invest prestige and resources into international institutions is seen as 
important evidence of the demand for formalized multilateral cooperation.  The theory 
does not, however, suggest that all institutions will matter at all times.  Also, the theory 
does not suggest that institutions act independent of the distribution of power among 
states.  Moreover, neoliberal scholarship does not intrinsically assume that states 
pursuing policy guided by liberal assumptions of international politics will necessarily 
pursue peaceful policies.  As Robert Keohane writes, “neoliberal approaches can backfire 
as policy prescriptions.”4 
 The neoliberal approach to international institutions traditionally focused 
analytical attention on economic and environmental cooperation, where the dangers of 
defection from cooperation are low, rather than security cooperation, where the dangers 
of defection are high.5  However, core components of neoliberal theory have been 
increasingly seen as applicable to international security.  International institutions, 
through established headquarters, staff, planning, rules, and procedures are thought to 
help states manage coordination and collaboration problems of collective action and 
make cooperation on security provision easier to achieve than in the absence of an 
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institution.  Such interaction, proximity, and transparency is thought to foster reassurance 
and trust, thereby reducing the sense of vulnerability and fear that results from 
international anarchy.  As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye demonstrate, security 
institutions can aid the exercise of influence, constrain bargaining strategies, balance or 
replace other institutions, signal governments’ intentions by providing others with 
information and making policies more predictable, specify obligations, and impact both 
the interests and preferences of states.6  Contemporary liberalism also increasingly 
emphasizes the role of institutions reflecting and advancing principles and norms of 
community standards, working in conjunction with information sharing, rules, and 
decision-making procedures as mechanisms for lowering the transaction costs of 
multilateral enforcement strategies. 
 
Principles and Norms 
 In a purely rationalist sense, neoliberal theory does not have much to say about 
the content of principles and norms – but rather presumes that states will define these as 
most befitting their common interests.  Neoliberal theory traditionally posits that states 
share an interest in establishing principles and norms to facilitate cooperation and provide 
clarity from international anarchy.  Principles and rules of institutions help states to 
address the uncertainty of the shadow of the future and for fear of establishing counter-
productive precedents.7  From this interaction, institutions are thought to, as Charles 
Kupchan notes, raise the costs of defection and define what constitutes defection while at 
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the same time advancing interstate socialization by promoting the concept of an 
international community.8  In this sense, security institutions can become important 
promoters of community values and also tools for channeling enforcement against 
violators of community principles and norms. 
 Some neoliberal scholars note that the theory has insufficiently accounted for the 
content of ideas and the relationship between principles, norms and institutional activity.9  
Drawing from the work of social constructivist theorists, particularly the works of 
Alexander Wendt, neoliberal scholars increasingly look to the specific content of 
principles and norms as important variables to understanding why states ascribe to 
particular institutions.  Moreover, institutions are seen as feeding back into the domestic 
sphere and preferences of states that act within formal institutions.10  Judith Goldstein and 
Robert Keohane assess the role of ideas shaping interests in terms of world views, 
principled beliefs, and causal beliefs.  Goldstein and Keohane write that, as regarding 
ideas embedded in institutions:  “…once a policy choice leads to the creation of 
reinforcing organizational and normative structures, that policy idea can affect the 
incentives of political entrepreneurs long after the interests of its initial proponents have 
changed.”11   
There are clear limits, however, to the power of ideas and institutions in a world 
that remains governed by interest-maximizing states as the predominant actors.  For 
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example, as Keohane notes, just because democracies come together to cooperate does 
not by nature mean that they will work together to export it.  He writes:  “Democracies 
may act to stop starvation or extreme abuses of human rights, as in Somalia, but they are 
unlikely to sacrifice significant welfare for the sake of democracy – especially when 
people realize how hard it is to create democracy and how ineffective intervention often 
is in doing so.”12  Some scholars take the combination of identity and institutions and 
conclude that NATO represents a pluralistic security community as initially posited by 
Karl Deutch – reflecting a region in Europe where war is no longer seen as a reasonable 
tool of resolving disputes.13  However, this approach is problematic because it ignores the 
NATO membership of Greece and Turkey which continue to prepare for war with each 
other.  Keohane does, however, expose a normative assumption in modern liberal theory 
in that “…the strength of liberalism as a moral theory lies in its attention to how 
governmental arrangements will operate in practice, and in particular, how institutions 
can protect human rights against the malign inclinations of power holders.”14  The ability 
of an institution to promote such outcomes might thus be higher under a circumstance in 
which the members of an organization have what Katja Weber calls a heterogeneity of 
states based on “religion, language, cultural, and political backgrounds of countries.”15  
NATO seeks to represent such a shared collective identity by identifying appropriate 
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behavior among democratic allies as well as criteria for domestic behavior within 
member states.  Thomas Risse refers to such activity as reflecting a “liberal constructivist 
approach” to explaining why NATO has incorporated the kinds of rules and procedures 
that have been developed within the institution.16  NATO’s enlargement to include new 
members symbolizes this desire to advance a particular state identity by establishing 
membership criteria that reflects the principles and norms enshrined in the institution. 
Much of NATO’s post-Cold War institutional adaptation – from its enlargement 
to its engagement in the Balkans - has been driven by a desire of its members to spread a 
particular set of principles and norms through the institution.17  Formal institutions like 
NATO can therefore serve as what Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal refer to as 
both a “community representative” and as “managers of enforcement” of international 
principles and norms.18  In this sense, principles and norms, and the values that they 
reflect can become an important causal factor for collective state action, channeled 
through international institutions. 
Information Sharing, Rules, Procedures, and Transaction Costs 
Neoliberal institutional theory posits that, as states seek to coordinate policy, 
institutions will lower the transaction costs of cooperation in ways that would not be 
possible were there no institution available.  The study of transaction costs draws from 
the assumption that states will assess the costs of bargaining relative to the costs of 
alternative policy choices.  Information sharing is seen as helping states overcome 
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various obstacles to cooperation while the rules and procedures of international 
institutions produce efficiency gains.19  As Robert Keohane demonstrates, international 
institutions and their functions are best understood as “information-providing and 
transaction cost-reducing entities.”20 
 Neoliberal theory does not imply that states will blindly follow an institutional 
path and instead assumes that states are likely to defect from institutional cooperation 
should the costs of multilateral cooperation outpace the perceived benefits.  Neoliberal 
theory has thus had limited application to understanding security relationships because 
the costs of one state’s defection or cheating from cooperation can threaten the very 
survival of another.21  As John J. Mearsheimer writes:  “Another state may be reliably 
benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because intentions are 
impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty.”22  Joseph M. Grieco has shown that:  
“even states that are currently allies may become competitors or enemies in the future.”23  
However, neoliberal theory posits that such fears can be overcome when states are not 
concerned with managing against threats, but are instead pre-occupied with managing 
risk and seeking means of preventing future conflict. 
  While neoliberal scholars hedge on the conditions for effective security 
cooperation, the theory nevertheless advances ambitious claims.  As Celeste Wallander 
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 11
maintains, international institutions play a role in security relations by reducing 
transaction costs and making it possible for states to cooperate when it is in their interest 
to do so.  To Wallander, rules and procedures are “institutional assets” that “…enable 
states to cooperate by providing resources, such as information on intentions or 
compliance;  by establishing rules for negotiations, decision-making, and 
implementation;  and by creating incentives to conform to international standards 
necessary for multilateral action.”24  Neoliberal theory generally focuses on international 
bargaining as measurement of effective reduction of transaction costs.  States are also 
seen as preferring to adapt existing institutions over the costs of creating new ones.  
However, transaction cost models also assume that states will seek and maintain 
institutions to increase the efficiency of providing for a common good. 
 
Neoliberal Theory and NATO:  Independent and Dependent Variables 
Neoliberal institutional theory has been prevalent in the study of European 
security since the end of the Cold War.  As Robert O. Keohane wrote in 1993 about 
Europe, if the theories of neoliberal institutionalists have any validity, “…the rich 
tapestry of institutions should both constrain states, through the operation of rules, and 
provide them with opportunities to cooperate, thus enabling them to pursue their own 
interests without positing the threats to other states that are so characteristic of realist 
anarchy.”25  Neoliberal scholars challenge the realist prediction that, as an alliance, 
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NATO will disband, lose its relevance, or be realigned based on new power realities.26  
Neoliberal approaches to NATO focus on its adaptation and new missions as evidence to 
support theoretical claims.  The institutional functions of NATO, as developed during the 
Cold War, are seen as being portable assets for addressing a new set of security 
challenges.27  From this methodological perspective, institutional adaptation is treated as 
the dependent variable. 
 Central to most neoliberal assessments of NATO is the proposition that it has 
always been “more than an alliance” – and such a conclusion is repeated regularly by 
both scholars and policymakers.  Conversely, policymakers and NATO secretary generals 
also assert that NATO is “first and foremost an alliance.”  One of NATO’s key architects, 
American Secretary of State Dean Acheson concluded that the various normative 
dimensions formulated within the NATO treaty were largely designed to appeal to public 
and parliamentary sentiment and that:  “The plain fact, of course, is that NATO is a 
military alliance.  Its purpose was and is to deter and, if necessary, to meet the use of 
Russian military power or the fear of its use in Europe.  This purpose is pretty old-
fashioned.”28  NATO’s institutional form was designed to promote reassurance among 
the European allies and to facilitate multilateral military planning.  NATO also gained the 
dual feature of easing the rearmament of Germany and providing its neighbors with 
reassurance following unification in 1991.  However, there is only one answer to the 
question of “who put the ‘O’ in NATO?” – the Soviet threat.  As a chief negotiator of the 
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NATO treaty, Charles Bohlen concluded, “Had the Soviet Union not chosen to prevent 
the unification of Germany in 1947 and 1948, there would have been no North Atlantic 
Treaty.”29  The United States militarized NATO and gave it a structure to facilitate 
coordination among the members.  NATO became an alliance organized around 
neoliberal functions.  But the independent variables that made NATO relevant as an 
institution were the Soviet threat and the exercise of American power. 
 NATO’s institutional form provided for the development of unique multilateral 
assets, particularly the multilateral military planning that facilitated transparency and 
reassurance among members, rules that facilitated consultation over non-collective 
defense issues, multilateral planning and exercises.  Together, these institutional 
functions were intended to lower the transaction costs of crisis management and security 
provision.  These institutional assets were enhanced by a habit of consultation within the 
institution that became a fundamental norm of member state behavior and included 
consultation on out-of-area conflicts and collective diplomacy during and after the Cold 
War.  Stephen Weber observes that, as NATO developed over time, it developed the 
capacity to facilitate communication through a network of permanent and intermittently 
meeting bodies, as well as ad hoc groups set up at the request of member states.  Thus 
Weber concludes that NATO could sustain this function after the Cold War via its 
institutions where “equivalence is favored over hierarchy, with decisions requiring 
unanimity and the formal organization existing primarily to enhance transparency and to 
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facilitate the transfer of information among states.”30  John Duffield maintains that 
“NATO’s institutional character has probably contributed to the alliance’s 
persistence…(NATO’s) supranational bodies and the individuals who head them have 
almost certainly helped the alliance to adapt to changing external circumstances by 
defining new tasks, identifying ways to achieve them, forging compromises, and 
otherwise providing leadership.”31  Robert McCalla has surveyed international relations 
theories applicable to NATO’s post-Cold War survival and concludes that neoliberal 
institutionalism has a high degree of explanatory value.32  Celeste Wallander explains 
NATO’s post-Cold War role in explicitly neoliberal terms by drawing conclusions about 
institutional adaptation to new circumstances via an application of transaction cost 
models.33 
 Such assessments of NATO provide a rich foundation for describing NATO’s 
post-Cold War survival.  Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane thus conclude that 
realist predictions about NATO “turned out to be wrong.”  They ask:  “What went wrong 
with realist theory, and right with NATO?”34  Neoliberal scholarship accurately portrays 
NATO’s survival as supporting the theory if one treats institutional adaptation as the 
dependent variable.  However, this analytical framework says nothing about the most 
important question facing contemporary Europe – does this institutional adaptation 
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33 Wallander, “Institutional Assets…” 
34 Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions,” in Helga 
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increase – or decrease - security?  If a methodological framework instead treats the 
institution as the independent variable and the provision of security as the dependent 
variable, then a far different conclusion about NATO and the relevance of neoliberal 
theory of security institutions emerges.   
 The Kosovo case demonstrates the utility of conceptualizing institutions as both 
independent and dependent variables.  As Robert Keohane asserts:  “institutions change 
as a result of human action, and the changes in expectation and process that result can 
exert profound effects on state behavior.”35  The credibility of NATO’s institutional 
adaptation became a critical, if not the critical reason that its members chose to fight a 
war through the institution as opposed to pursuing a coalition of the willing.  However, in 
terms of warfighting, this decision decreased efficiency of providing for security as the 
dependent variable.  The institutional assets of NATO were liabilities in a crisis and were 
the primary explanatory factor behind suboptimal outcomes of security provision.   
The failure of neoliberal theory to address the conditions for institutional 
effectiveness is serious, possibly dangerous, because the approach confuses what actually 
increases international security.  For example, in 1995, NATO engaged in a limited air 
campaign and subsequent peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Since 
NATO’s members intervened via the institution, Bosnia-Herzegovina has avoided the 
perils of ongoing civil conflict.  NATO played an important institutional role in reducing 
the transaction costs of intervention because the organization had conducted planning for 
such an operation since 1993.  The Bosnian Muslims needed a rapid intervention to gain 
reassurance against the event that Serb forces might use negotiation as a ploy to regroup 
and fight another day.  Only NATO could provide the force structure necessary for a 
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rapid intervention that was generated through multilateral planning and exercises that 
assured interoperability of forces, command, communication, intelligence, and logistics.  
NATO’s adaptive programs such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and 
Partnership for Peace also helped to integrate non-NATO members for security provision.  
Nevertheless, NATO did not cause the peace.  NATO’s air strikes against Bosnian Serb 
forces were helpful, but it was the major land offensive by an alliance between Bosnian 
Muslims and Croats that brought the Serbs to the negotiating table.  As NATO’s Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Wesley K. Clark said to Slobodan Milosevic, “Mr. 
President…NATO didn’t even fight this war.  You lost it to the Croats and Mulsims.”36  
More broadly, NATO was an important means of promoting post-Cold War European 
security – but the key source of peace was the balance of power as codified in defensive 
military doctrines and legalized in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.37   
 Had neoliberal theory been focused more on the hard cases of the conditions for 
institutional relevance, the approach might have been less ambitiously applied through 
the 1990s.38  Consequently, programmatic activity and institutional adaptation would not 
have been seemingly confused with increasing security.  On issues such as NATO 
enlargement, neoliberal analysis might have seen the outcome as decreasing the capacity 
for effective action by the institution due to dilution and over-complication of decision-
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making procedures.  Instead, neoliberal theory tended to see NATO enlargement as a 
logical reflection of the transformation of NATO via the spread of its institutional assets 
for cooperation.39  Despite such neoliberal optimism about NATO as a security 
institution, it is hard to ignore that while NATO intervened in 1995 in Bosnia, it only 
acted when the key variable emerged to make NATO relevant – the exercise of American 
power channeled through the institution.  During the previous four years, NATO served 
as a mechanism for constraining state strategies and the exercise of influence, as 
neoliberal theory would posit.  Yet, during this institutional buck-passing period, some 
250,000 Bosnians went dead or missing.  NATO did nothing when the state of Albania 
collapsed in 1997, prompting an intervention by a coalition of the willing led by Italy 
(Operation Alba) to restore order in this keystone Balkan state.40   
Measured in terms of NATO’s new missions and security provision, the relevance 
of NATO’s transformation as an independent variable can be counted as, at best, a partial 
success and, at worst, decreasing security.  When the Kosovo conflict emerged in 1998-
1999, NATO was caught unprepared, was divided over policy preferences, and engaged 
in warfighting that produced far below sub-optimal outcomes.  The Kosovo campaign 
should have been an easy case for the application of neoliberal assumptions and yet it 
was not.  Instead, the Kosovo war was such an exceptionally hard challenge to NATO’s 
institutional functions that its relevance has been in steep decline since.  When its NATO 
allies offered assistance in the American-led war in Afghanistan, the organization was 
avoided and the notion that the mission should shape the international coalition, and not 
                                                 
39 Celeste Wallander and Robert O. Keohane suggest that “NATO’s expansion could thus foreshadow, not 
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management institution.”  Haftendorn, et al, Imperfect Unions…, pp. 45-46. 
40 Sean Kay, “From Operation Alba to Allied Force:  Institutional Implications of Balkan Interventions,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 4 (Fall 1999):  pp. 72-89. 
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that the coalition should shape the mission, became deeply embedded in American 
strategic thinking.  The United States, NATO’s key member that provides its institutions 
with relevance, no longer thinks in “NATO-first” terms. 
 
Principles, Norms and the Cause of War 
 Throughout the 1990s, its members redesigned NATO’s institutional attributes by 
giving the organization new mandates and institutional designs intended to build a 
“Europe whole and free.”  In the absence of a common over-arching threat, the members 
of NATO emphasized the common principles and norms that they shared.  NATO would 
be a tool for coordinating outreach to the East and thus projecting stability into Central 
and Eastern Europe while integrating Russia into western institutions.  Member states 
also sought to keep the institution busy out of a common belief that it remained essential 
to sustain the transatlantic relationship that the United States supplied Europe via NATO, 
while at the same time reassuring European countries about the rising power of a united 
Germany.  NATO survived the 1990s on an agenda designed to manage risk, reduce 
uncertainty, and prevent the re-nationalization of defense doctrines by stressing the 
unique “Euro-Atlantic” values that NATO promoted. 
 The content of NATO’s norms are enshrined in the founding North Atlantic 
Treaty which mandates members of the institution “to safeguard the freedom, common 
heritage and civilization of their peoples.”41  NATO’s mandate to promote community 
principles and norms was codified at the 1999 Washington Summit which celebrated the 
institution’s fiftieth anniversary.  NATO’s “New Strategic Concept” declared the new 
mission to be to:  “stand firm against those who violate human rights, wage war, and 
                                                 
41 Text of the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949. 
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conquer territory.”42  NATO was to “contribute to building a stronger and broader Euro-
Atlantic community of democracies – a community where human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are upheld;  where borders are increasingly open to people;  ideas and 
commerce;  where war becomes unthinkable.”43  NATO’s Secretary General, Dr. Javier 
Solana, declared that the new Strategic Concept “marks the transition from an alliance 
concerned mainly with collective defense to one which will be a guarantee of security in 
Europe and an upholder of democratic values both within and beyond our borders.”44  
After the war, Solana asserted that:  “NATO is determined to uphold our values – 
because values mean nothing if we are not willing to take action to defend them.”45  The 
American ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow declared that:  “NATO is now in 
the business of defending common values and interests as well as the territory of its 
members…Our shared values – freedom, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights – are themselves every bit as much worth defending as is our territory.”46 
 Instability in the Balkans was a fundamental challenge to NATO’s claim to post-
Cold War security relevance and ethnic-cleansing was a direct threat to NATO’s new 
values-based mission.  Programmatic activity like NATO enlargement was interesting, 
but if NATO was only to integrate the most stable areas of Europe (like Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic), while doing nothing to manage ethnic cleansing and genocide 
in the Balkans, then its institutional legitimacy would be threatened.  The fact that NATO 
had so blundered in its initial four years of inaction in Bosnia also deeply impacted 
                                                 
42 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999. 
43 The Washington Declaration, signed and issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in 
the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on 23 and 24 April 1999. 
44 Statement by NATO Secretary General Dr. Javier Solana, NATO Summit, Washington, D.C. 24 April 
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45 Speech by Javier Solana at the XVIth International NATO Workshop, Budapest, Hungary, 21 June 1999. 
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Kosovo, 30 June 1999. 
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decision-makers who confronted the Kosovo dilemma in 1998.  As US Secretary of State 
Madeleine K. Albright asserted in March 1998:  “We are not going to stand by and watch 
the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in 
Bosnia.”47  NATO leaders, especially British Prime Minister Tony Blair and US 
President Bill Clinton were especially animated about the normative foundations and 
rationale for a war in Kosovo.  During the war, Tony Blair declared that:  “This is a just 
war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values.”48  President Clinton concluded 
after the war during a speech in Macedonia, the Kosovo conflict demonstrated that:  
“Whether you live in Africa or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes 
after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic 
background or their religion, and it’s within our power to stop it, we will stop it.”49 
 The growing humanitarian catastrophe inside Kosovo, combined with NATO’s 
new focus on promoting values, helped to elevate the Kosovo conflict from what Joseph 
Nye described as a transition from a “C list” to an “A list” crisis.50  While it was 
important that NATO’s decision-makers were directing foreign policy based on 
normative agendas, it was ultimately the risk to NATO’s credibility that energized the 
leaders into war.  Principles and norms alone were not enough to get NATO members to 
go to war – as the 1991-1995 period in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated.  However, the 
larger institutional costs of not acting on NATO’s new mandate, and the threat to the 
credibility of NATO as an institution that this created, was a primary rationale for 
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beginning the Kosovo war.  As Tony Blair declared in the House of Commons on the eve 
of war:  “To walk away now would destroy NATO’s credibility.”51 
Up to 1998, the issue of Kosovo was managed through a bilateral containment 
strategy put in place by the United States.  Just before leaving office, the administration 
of US President George H.W. Bush sent a classified message to Belgrade on 24 
December 1992 warning that:  “…in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian 
action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and 
Serbia proper.”52  When Serb forces began a graduated campaign of human rights 
violations in response to a growing Kosovar movement toward autonomy, and a more 
violent movement toward independence spurred by the emergence of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) in spring 1998, the credibility of America’s deterrent threat was 
challenged.  However, the credibility of NATO and its new missions reflecting 
community principles and norms was undermined - thus adding to America’s strategic 
costs.  The United States hoped to resolve both problems by making its Kosovo strategy 
multilateral and channeling it through NATO – even though the European allies were 
reluctant to implement any threat of violence against Serbia.  In fact, the European allies 
utilized their institutional leverage in NATO to constrain growing American pressure for 
a military assault against Serbia through late winter 1999.   
The United States pushed hard to advance military pressure on Serbia, but 
through winter 1998, its preferences were constrained by the European allies acting 
through NATO.  The United States successfully convinced the NATO members to adapt 
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a policy of coercive diplomacy toward the Serbs, but could only convince its allies to use 
a slow and deliberate public process of elevating various Action Orders (ACTORDs) to 
advance multilateral planning for intervention – not to actually impement policy.  
Competing policy preferences among the European allies, especially involving a strong 
desire in Germany and France to have a United Nations Security Council mandate for any 
intervention, prevented NATO from acting.  Nonetheless, by March 1999 escalating 
human rights violations by Serbs against the Albanians, to include massacres of civilians, 
combined with failed diplomatic efforts to convince the European allies to authorize the 
start of a war.  It was the threat to the principles and norms that NATO was now intended 
to represent that led the allies into war – both to help the cause of ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo, but also as an institutional rescue mission for NATO.  Even the countries in 
NATO most opposed to a war in Yugoslovia, for example Greece, chose in favor of the 
broader interests of NATO and supported the start of the Kosovo war.   
NATO’s institutional functions brought the United States into a particular means 
of warfighting than it otherwise would have had it continued its unilateral deterrence 
policy toward Serbia.  Neoliberal theory thus provides an important explanation for why 
NATO went to war in Kosovo.  Nevertheless, NATO was far less effective at 
implementing collective policies consistent with the principles and norms it sought to 
advance.  First, when NATO went to war, it did so without the legal authorization of the 
United Nations Security Council – which under international law is the sole body which 
can authorize an offensive attack against a sovereign country.  While NATO would serve 
as a political surrogate for legitimacy, acting outside the United Nations was a violation 
of NATO’s founding treaty.  Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that members 
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must “refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations.”  Article 7 of the NATO treaty requires members to respect “the primary 
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.”  Second, the means of fighting agreed to by NATO exposed contradictions 
between NATO’s values and its institutional outcomes.  The NATO allies were unwilling 
to consider a ground threat and agreed only to an air campaign bombing from over 
15,000 feet.  NATO members signaled that the lives of hundreds of thousands of ethnic-
Albanians were not worth risking the lives of western pilots or airplanes.53  Innocent 
civilians were killed by errant NATO bombs, including convoys of Albanian refugees 
who were fleeing Serb forces.  Eventually, NATO would target Serb television and other 
civilian infrastructure including electric power grids which also damaged civilian 
drinking water – both were violations of the humanitarian laws of war.  Third, when the 
war ended and NATO forces entered Kosovo as peacekeepers, displaced ethnic 
Albanians returned to Kosovo and carried out a reverse ethnic cleansing of Serbs from 
the province – all in the presence of NATO troops who did nothing to stop this outcome.  
Finally, in fighting for principles, NATO held Serbia and its human rights violations to a 
higher standard than its own member Turkey which had a persistent pattern of significant 
human rights violations and extra-constitutional changes in government during its history 
as a NATO member.54 
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Inconsistency aside, the decisions to launch a war, and to wage war explicitly 
through NATO are best explained by neoliberal theory.  NATO’s principles and norms 
provided a rationale for the institution to serve as an enforcer of community values.  Still 
seeing utility in maintaining NATO and seeking legitimacy for intervention outside the 
United Nations, the United States switched from a bilateral to an institutional means of 
implementing its policy toward Kosovo.  The United States and its allies calculated that 
the risks of not using NATO to manage the Kosovo crisis, and thus the crisis of 
credibility that such a decision would pose, was worth associated costs that might come 
with fighting a war through the institution.  The decision to start a war in March 1999 
reflected an apex of behavior among states and institutions that is best explained by 
neoliberal theory. 
 
War by Committee:  Information Flows and Transaction Costs 
 Information flows, as embodied in multilateral planning and decision-making are 
the lifeblood of NATO.  The assumption that NATO facilitates effective planning and 
that its rules and procedures lower the transaction costs of cooperation are central to the 
neoliberal explanation of NATO’s persistence.  However, information flowed widely in 
and around, before and during the Kosovo war.  Rather than provide clarity and 
efficiency, information flows were either ignored, made decisions more difficult, or were 
exploited by the enemy.  One of the key assets that a multilateral planning institution can 
provide to states is to help them learn the nature of risks through the sharing of 
information and thus to better coordinate responses when they choose to act collectively.  
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NATO members were not lacking for information about the risks of a major crisis 
involving Kosovo.  For a decade, analysts within and outside NATO had warned about 
the destabilizing consequences of conflict in Kosovo.  NATO members were also well-
versed on the willingness of Serb forces to carry out brutal ethnic cleansing campaigns.  
NATO also already had several years of direct experience managing Balkan affairs via its 
peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
While considerable Balkans experience existed within NATO, the information 
was not effectively transferred into decision-making.  A major lesson of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina experience - on which virtually all of NATO’s leadership agreed  - was that 
early and credible intervention would be key to keeping inter-ethnic conflict from 
escalating.  Nevertheless, it would take NATO a year from when its member’s leaders 
began to threaten force in Kosovo to the decision to implement it.  Additionally, senior 
NATO member state officials believed that, as with the selective use of air power against 
Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, a few days of limited bombing would force 
Milosevic to capitulate and reach a negotiated settlement.  These leaders believed it was 
the limited air strikes that had led the Serbs to negotiate peace in 1995.  This assumption 
was so pervasive inside NATO that the initial authorization for a bombing campaign only 
permitted military staff to plan for three days of air strikes.  However, as SACEUR, Gen. 
Wesley Clark, had previously signaled to Milosevic, it was the Muslim-Croat ground 
campaign that created a new balance of power, combined with air strikes, that led to a 
peace settlement in 1995.  NATO’s decision-makers ignored institutional facts and 
denied their military an essential component of victory. 
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 Reflecting the assuredness of a quick victory – what became known in NATO 
circles as the “short war syndrome” - U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and 
senior NATO officials predicted that the war would not be a long-term operation and 
would be over in a matter of several days.  NATO planners were not allowed to prepare 
for the possibility that the Serbs might resist NATO’s air campaign – as they did with a 
rapid attack by 40,000 Serb forces on Albanians known as Operation Horseshoe.  Experts 
inside the U.S. government and at NATO headquarters had warned since fall 1998 that 
starting the air campaign would not deter further attacks on Kosovar Albanians.  
Intelligence officials also warned that launching an air campaign would likely exacerbate 
a refugee crisis in Albania and Macedonia and strengthen the nationalist grip of the 
Milosevic regime in Belgrade.55  In a glaring planning failure, just three days before the 
NATO bombing began, international refugee services in Albania had a capacity to 
receive only 10,000 people.  The total number to flee from Kosovo during the three 
month conflict was 863,000.  Given that the primary threat to regional stability would be 
a collapse of fragile Albania and Macedonia into ethnic conflict and chaos, this lack of 
adequate preparation was a major institutional failure. 
 NATO’s public divisions over whether to start a war, and how to wage one, 
provided open source intelligence to its adversary.  In fact, U.S. and NATO officials 
purposefully made their use of force plans public as part of their effort at coercive 
diplomacy.  The hope was that if Milosevic and his military knew what was coming from 
NATO, they would seek negotiation.  However, NATO’s approach had the opposite 
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effect, leading Milosevic to conclude that the members of the institution were not serious 
about war, that they might be politically divided, and the limited air campaign waited out.  
If this strategy was successful, NATO would eventually declare victory and go home 
leaving the Milosevic regime intact and Kosovo purged of Albanians.  Prior to the 
outbreak of war, Milosevic adjusted his policies in Kosovo to maximize institutional 
differences on the premise that “a village a day keeps NATO away.”  As the chairman of 
NATO’s Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann asserts, Milosevic “rightly 
concluded that the NATO threat was a bluff.”56  In a study for the Rand Corporation, 
Benjamin Lambeth concluded that NATO’s public strategy of coercive diplomacy “gave 
Milosevic time to bolster his forces, disperse important military assets, hunker down for 
an eventual bombing campaign, and lay the final groundwork for the ethnic cleansing of 
Kosovo.”57  
 During battle, NATO’s information flows made its political decisions more 
difficult to implement.  In an major after-action assessment, NATO’s theater commander 
at AFSOUTH, Admiral James O. Ellis, noted that had information been used more 
effectively by NATO, the length of the campaign might have been shortened by half.58  
The Serbs were far more efficient at the strategic use of information than was NATO, 
whose spokesmen spent hours explaining NATO accidents, while Serb forces ethnically 
cleansed hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians while answering to no one.  NATO 
personnel responsible for the management of public information at its Brussels 
headquarters complained privately that military planners at SHAPE in Mons left the 
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civilian side of the information operation uninformed about the military operations they 
were required to explain to the media.  And yet the civilian spokesmen at NATO 
headquarters became the focal point of world-wide broadcasts of daily press updates.  
Not only were the NATO spokesmen uninformed of what the military was doing, they 
also had the added challenge of only being able to relay the agreed consensus policy of 
the nineteen NATO countries.59  One NATO spokesman was speaking for nineteen 
countries.  Also at NATO headquarters, Milosevic had gained “interior lines” of 
information as a French officer was convicted after the war of supplying the Serbs with 
classified NATO war plans.  The presence of a persistent Serb journalist at NATO press 
conference also served as a convenient propaganda asset for Milosevic.   
Coalition military communications were undermined by the high-tech capabilities 
of American jets which were not shared by the other NATO members.  Classified 
communications about targets and flight patterns were occassionally done on open 
channels, were intercepted by Serb intelligence, and related back to the targets which 
were often quickly relocated.  Despite fifty years of military planning and exercising, a 
significant lack of trust existed within NATO over the sharing of the most sensitive of 
operational information.  For example, the United States did not share specifics for 
hundreds of sorties that involved the use of F-117s, B2s, and cruise missiles, so as to 
guarantee sole American control over US-only assets and as a protection against leaks 
among allies who might compromise mission security.60  An information failure 
misidentified the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade – a building that western diplomats had 
visited often – as a Serb military target and NATO planes bombed it.  U.S. Secretary of 
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Defense William Cohen concluded that:  “Clearly, faulty information led to a mistake in 
the initial targeting of this facility.  In addition, the extensive process in place used to 
select and validate targets did not correct this original error.”61  Cohen determined that 
the accidental bombing was “an institutional error” – largely resulting from NATO’s 
incoherent rush to find targets following the early failures of its war planning.62   
If transaction costs are measured in terms of producing efficient security 
outcomes, then NATO’s information sharing via multilateral planning for war fighting 
decreased security in Kosovo.  Information flows in and around NATO became more 
additive to the “fog of war” than to provide clarity.  In the end, the public dimension of 
information also hardened support for NATO’s air campaign when western media 
televised the Serb expulsion of ethnic Albanians thus evoking images of the holocaust.  
However, this outcome had more to do with modern communications technology – the 
“CNN factor” - and nothing to do with any strategy formulated within the institution of 
NATO.   
When the war did not go according to NATO’s plans, the institution was quickly 
paralyzed by its rules and procedures.  NATO’s members were unable to adjust the 
institution to changed external circumstances.  This outcome was predictable.  When 
Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema met President Clinton before the war began, he 
asked what would happen if the air strikes failed and Clinton had no answer.  The only 
thing NATO could agree on was that it would continue to do more of the same.63  For an 
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institution who’s primary institutional function is facilitating the flow of information via 
multilateral planning, it was unable to prepare a “Plan B” in the event of failure.  
NATO’s military leader’s requests before and during the war to update and widen the 
scope of planning, to include instituting a credible ground threat, were rebuffed by their 
political leaders.  Had SACEUR, Gen. Wesley K. Clark, insisted on considering the 
consequences of failure of the initial limited air campaign, there might not have been any 
authorization for a war at all.64  When NATO met for its 50th anniversary summit in April 
1999, the measure of success was that there was no defection from cooperation, not the 
adaption of more effective means of providing security.  Agreements to impose an oil 
embargo on Yugoslavia quickly disappeared.  A decision to deploy Apache attack 
helicopters was eventually reached – though there was never consensus in NATO to use 
them.  NATO did have three stages of intensity planned for the air campaign.  However, 
there never was a “fourth level” if the first three failed.   
According to Adm. Ellis, the operational costs of the “short war syndrome” were 
negative impacts on Joint Task Force activation, staff composition, facilities, command 
and control, logistics and execution;  a lack of coherent campaign planning;  a lack of 
component staffing;  and a race to find suitable targets.65  Adm. Ellis concluded that the 
institutional environment affected “every aspect of planning and execution.”  In 
particular, NATO’s institutional attributes caused ‘incremental war’ instead of decisive 
operation;  excessive collateral damage concerns created sanctuaries and opportunities for 
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the adversary which were successfully exploited;  and the difficulty of NATO’s 
conducting out-of-area operations was not anticipated.66 
As a planning institution, NATO failed to lower transaction costs and the causal 
variable was NATO’s institutional assets.  NATO’s rules and decision-making 
procedures raised the transaction costs and lowered the efficiency gains of security 
provision.  The basic operating rule in NATO is that all decisions are unanimous and 
represent the consensus of all the members of the institution.  Procedurally, any member 
can exert a veto in the agenda-setting or consensus-building consultation process which 
becomes the procedure for collective decision-making.  A “vote” in NATO is only taken 
in the negative form when a state’s ambassador “breaks silence” based on home-
government instructions to declare objections over a particular issue.  Consequently, 
NATO decision-making takes place through formal and informal procedures.  To build 
consensus, the most effective means of policymaking comes from informal consultations 
among NATO representatives.  This process is fostered and facilitated by the office of the 
NATO Secretary General and the international secretariat in Brussels – but it is a state 
driven process.  The benefits of these rules and decision-making procedures come from 
the political solidarity that is achieved when the institution’s policies reflect the will of its 
members.  NATO policy, however, also by nature reflects the lowest common 
denominator of multilateral decision-making.  In the case of the Kosovo campaign, this 
process worked to get NATO members to agree to launch the war and there was no 
eventual defection from the agreed consensus.  However, the NATO members also could 
not agree to take steps to increase the efficiency of warfighting in a way that would have 
more effectively increased security. 
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 As NATO went through a year of public disagreement on the use of force in 
Kosovo, the consensus process left the institution open to influence from outside forces.  
Russia, in particular, strongly opposed NATO action against its long-time Serb friends 
and was worried about the further extension of NATO’s influence toward its borders.  
Affirming the assumption of neoliberal theory that institutions could be used by states to 
pursue constraining and bargaining strategies, Russia effectively entered the consensus 
process in NATO by leaning heavily on NATO members and using its veto in the United 
Nations to prevent NATO from gaining the legal mandate for legitimizing intervention as 
was preferred by most European NATO allies through fall 1998.  In an August 1998 
telephone conversation, President Clinton and French President Jacques Chirac agreed 
that, at that time, NATO could not intervene in Kosovo without Russian approval.67  
Russia held no formal veto over NATO policy, but it was able to delay any attack on the 
Serbs and to bolster NATO member’s opposition to ground forces planning.  While 
neoliberal claims about institutions mattering were affirmed by Russia’s strategy, 
Moscow’s ability to impact the institutional rules and decision-making procedures made 
it more difficult for NATO’s members to agree to a means of increasing security. 
 The inefficiency of NATO’s consensus process led to assertions that the 
institution was fighting a “war by committee”.  The opportunity of NATO members to 
review target sets, and if they chose, to veto them had a significant impact on the ability 
of the organization to produce an efficient security outcome.   As the war progressed, key 
decisions within the institution were relegated to a “quad” of the four major NATO 
powers (U.S., Britain, France, Germany and occasionally Italy) which made operational 
choices on behalf of the institution – thus moving further away from the neoliberal 
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premise of NATO’s collective responsibility.  Eventually, the lead NATO allies approved 
a variety of targets from a more advanced stage of NATO planning without the required 
authority of the NATO consensus process.68  The more NATO entered the hard realm of 
security provision – and the more it looked as though its rules and procedures were 
leading to failure – NATO members abandoned the institution’s rules and procedures.  
After three months of failure, NATO nearly had its first member state defection – its key 
member, the United States.  On 2 June 1999, U.S. National Security Adviser Sandy 
Berger asserted that Milosevic would be defeated by any means necessary.  According to 
Berger, victory would be won ‘in or outside NATO…a consensus in NATO is valuable.  
But it is not a sine qua non.  We want to move with NATO, but it can’t prevent us from 
moving.”69  The United States appeared ready to abandon NATO in favor of its unilateral 
priorities when on 3 June 1999 Milosevic capitulated – most likely due to a combination 
of fear of a pending ground invasion and Russian diplomacy.  Whatever the reason for 
Milosevic’s decision to quit the Kosovo war, the timing and means of the end of the war 
were ceded to Milosevic.  There is no evidence to suggest that the victory had anything to 
do with outcomes promulgated by NATO as an international institution. 
 
Neoliberal Theory and the Future of Multilateral Military Action 
 The Kosovo war illustrates a continuum of relevance for neoliberal theory of 
international security institutions.  If the institution is treated as the dependent variable, 
then institutional persistence is important evidence of relevance.  In the Kosovo case, the 
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sustainability of NATO’s fragile consensus over warfighting means was seen by its 
members as a reasonable trade-off over the alternative – the end of NATO.  Sustaining 
the credibility of NATO as an institution was a pivotal, if not the pivotal, reason for the 
start of the war.  NATO did help to lower the transaction costs of strategic bargaining 
before the war.  The United States, by acting through NATO gained legitimacy for its 
preferred policy of the use of force.  In turn, the European allies, who were skeptical of 
the use of force, gained institutional influence over war fighting policy.  NATO was the 
key transit point around which this strategic bargain was centered and the presence of 
NATO made it easier to reach such an accommodation.  
If, however, security is the dependent variable and the international institution 
tested as the independent variable, then the Kosovo war signals a major challenge to 
neoliberal assumptions about security institutions and transaction costs.  When 
institutional rules and procedures inhibited the enforcement of community principles and 
norms - thereby decreasing security - states moved away from institutional cooperation 
favoring ad-hoc coalitions.  A particular problem for neoliberal theory is the assumption 
that, as the costs of institutional cooperation become too high, defection occured.  Why 
did the costs become so high in the Kosovo case?  Because NATO was the means 
through which the provision of security was channeled.  In the end, the way to reduce 
transaction costs was to limit the number of participants in decision-making by skirting 
the rules and procedures of the institution. 
 The costs of NATO’s involvement in the Kosovo war were both immediate and 
institutional.  Costs were immediate for ethnic Albanians whom NATO went to war to 
protect.  Errant bombing, and a failure to deter attacks by Serb forces against ethnic 
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Albanians, combined with the unnecessary prolonging of the war due to ineffective 
military planning and operations, led to more suffering among the Kosovar Albanians, 
and created more strains on neighboring Albania and Macedonia, than was necessary.  
Rightly or wrongly, a widespread impression emerged within NATO countries that it was 
the decision to bomb that had prompted the ethnic-cleansing campaign by the Serb 
forces.  Because a declared mission of the war was to deter and prevent further attacks 
against ethnic Albanians, the war quickly appeared to be a failure of methods - if not 
goals.  In this sense, there was a moral failing in both the policy and the theoretical 
assumptions about NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation.  More people suffered and died in 
Kosovo than needed to because of the decision to involve NATO’s institutional assets in 
the provision of international security. 
 NATO’s objectives in Kosovo were eventually met in spite of the institution’s 
rules and procedures.  Allied military forces worked to the best of their ability in a highly 
politicized and operationally constrained environment, producing the most precise and 
lowest collateral damage air campaign to that point in history.  No aircrews were lost, and 
Yugoslav forces eventually retreated.  Nevertheless, the costs of the war can also be 
measured in institutional terms in that the war produced a significant diminution in the 
seriousness with which its key member states factor NATO into their foreign and defense 
policy planning.  Staying coordinated during the Kosovo campaign proved so hard and 
unrewarding for the NATO members that it would lead one senior official from a NATO 
member state to conclude that the key lesson of the Kosovo war was that NATO should 
“never do something like this again.”70   
                                                 
70 Interview with former high level NATO military official. 
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 Combined with NATO’s failure to engage as a major player in the US-led 
coalition against international terrorism, the American rejection of a NATO role in 
warfighting in Afghanistan, and the institutional blocking actions taken by Belgium, 
France, Germany, and Luxembourg to prevent NATO from engaging in collective 
defense support for ally Turkey during the 2003 Iraq crisis, NATO has been relegated to 
a secondary international institution at best.  The Kosovo campaign exposed NATO’s 
institutional assets as producing suboptimal security outcomes.  For the key country that 
makes NATO relevant via the extension of power, the United States, planners no longer 
think in “NATO first” terms. 
 The key methodological challenge for neoliberal theory is whether an alternative 
strategy would have led to more optimal outcomes than were provided by NATO.  While 
states could not have known what the outcomes would have been going into the conflict, 
both theorists and policymakers clearly overestimated the efficiency gains of security 
provision channeled through NATO.  The suboptimal provision of security during the 
Kosovo war resulted from an explicit decision by the United States to shift its unilateral 
containment declaration from 24 December 1992 into a multilateral format in NATO.  In 
so doing, the United States exposed its preferred warfighting doctrine to the institutional 
rules and procedures of NATO.  The United States could have fought Serbia unilaterally 
and the testimony of military planners illustrates that they believed that such an approach, 
perhaps combined with a coalition of the willing mandated, but not managed, by NATO, 
would have led to greater efficiency in security provision.  Ironically, the United States 
fought a mostly unilateral war in Serbia – dropping 80 percent of the high-tech precision 
weapons and 95 percent of cruise missiles, while supplying 90 percent of all electronic 
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warfare and intelligence/reconnaissance capabilities.71  In the end, American planners 
concluded that the costs of working the Kosovo problem through NATO were higher 
than the alternative of leading an ad-hoc coalition of the willing. 
 As Lt. Gen. Michael Short, the commander of NATO’s air campaign concluded 
after the war: 
 I believe that before the first bomb was dropped, the door should have 
 been closed, with all those inside who wished to go to war.  The United 
 States should have said very clearly, “It appears that NATO wants to go to 
 war in the air, and in the air only.  If that is the case, the sentiment of the 
 nations here, we will lead you to war.  We the United States will provide the 
leadership, the enabling force, the majority of the striking power, and the 
technology required.  We will take this alliance to war, and we will win 
this thing for you.  But the price to be paid is we call the tune.  We are not  
just one of nineteen nations.  We will pick the targets.  Certainly we’ll ask 
for your approval, but we will design the grand strategy to get this done.   
Those of you who do not approve of what we’ve designed, pull your forces  
that night or for a series of nights.  We understand that.  But you don’t get to  
stop the effort.  You don’t have the ability to change the thrust.  We’re going 
to send our young men and women to war.  We’re going to fly into the teeth 
of the threat, and we’ll bear the brunt of the cost and risk.  In exchange for  
that, we are going to call the tune.  And what that means ladies and gentlemen 
from the other eighteen nations, is that we are going to conduct a classic air 
campaign from the very first night.  The lights are going out, the bridges are 
coming down, and the military headquarters are going to be blown up.  And 
we’re going to go after that target set until it’s destroyed.  We think that’ll bring 
Milosevic to the table, but if it doesn’t that’s the best that we can do.  That’s the 
problem with conducting strictly an air war.72 
 
After the war, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen proclaimed that: “if we were to 
carry out and act unilaterally, we would have a much more robust aggressive, and 
decapitating type of campaign…The difference here, of course, is that we’re acting as an 
alliance.”73  As Benjamin Lambeth summarizes: 
                                                 
71 Prepared Statement of the Honorable William S. Cohen, to the Senate Armed Services Committee,” 
Hearng, U.S. Policy and Military Operations Regarding Kosovo, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
106 Cong. 2 sess (20 July 1999), pp. 5-6. 
72 Interview with Gen. Micahel Short, PBS Frontline, War in Europe.  www.pbs/org/frontline. 
73 William Cohen, interview, PBS Frontline, War in Europe.  www.pbs/org/frontline. 
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A senior NATO official commented that “NATO got in way over its head, 
stumbled through, didn’t know how to get out, [and] was scared to death by what 
was happening.”  This official added that the entire bombing effort had been a 
“searing experience” that had “left a bitter taste of tilting within governments, 
between governments, between NATO headquarters in Brussels and the military 
headquarters at Mons.”  Reflecting the consensus arrived at by many senior U.S. 
military officers, both active and retired, Admiral Leighton Smith concluded that 
“the lesson we’ve learned is that coalitions aren’t good ways to fight wars” and 
that, at a minimum, the political process in NATO needed to be streamlined so 
that the collective could use force in a way that made greatest military sense.”74 
 
By 2000, NATO was no longer holding a place of priority in U.S. military planning.  
NATO is no longer the place where American officers go to earn their stars and the level 
of transatlantic military socialization is in significant decline.  The United States is 
considering repositioning its military in Europe outside of Germany and the basic 
institutional functions of NATO are in question.  However, the key question really is why 
America needs to keep any troops in Europe at all, and what the decline of NATO means 
for the future of German foreign policy. 
 An irony for neoliberal theory is that the best way for NATO to regain its 
institutional relevance for security provision would be to reform and streamline the rules 
and decision-making process.  However, the very rules and procedures that make NATO 
so in need of reform would require consensus to even place such adaptation on the 
agenda.  What small or medium states will cede their influence gained via NATO so as to 
allow great powers to exert unconstrained international influence?  In essence, NATO’s 
rules make changing the rules impossible – to the point where the transaction costs of 
creating alternative institutional arrangements and multilateral forms for security 
provision are no longer prohibitive.  This will likely be especially true for the European 
members of NATO who, after the war in Iraq, increasingly see American power as 
                                                 
74 Benjamin Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo…p. 205-206. 
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something to be constrained.  If NATO continues to be a means of tying the hands of the 
United States, then Washington will only further move away from its institutional assets 
– and consequently the Europeans would be more inclined to build up an alternative to 
NATO in the European Union.   
Depending on how one measures the dependent variable, neoliberal institutional 
theory of international relations is both confirmed and challenged by the evidence 
provided via the Kosovo war.  This does not mean that neoliberal theory is irrelevant to 
security outcomes or that institutions do not matter – in fact the converse is true.  
However, this study demonstrates that, when applying neoliberal assumptions to security 
outcomes, the theory must be challenged by hard tests so that the limits of neoliberal 
theory will be best understood – and thus security increased. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
